题 目：The Impact of Private Channel on Information Disclosure - Evidence from Board Network and R&D Narrative
会议室：ID：383 433 817
黄蓉,东华大学经济学学学士、密西西比州立大学经济学硕士、美国德州大学达拉斯分校管理科学硕士、美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校管理科学（会计）博士，现为复旦大学管理学院教授、博士生导师。曾任美国纽约市立大学巴鲁克学院副教授（终身教职）、中欧国际商学院访问助理教授。主要研究方向为绩效评估、薪酬设计、成本管理、企业估值、资本市场。在Contemporary Accounting Research，The Accounting Review，Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics，Review of Accounting Studies，Journal of Accounting Research，Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance等高水平杂志上发表多篇文章。
Firms weigh the costs of public disclosure against the benefits of information transparency when disseminating narrative R&D information. In this paper, we examine whether firms with more private information dissemination channels will reduce their public disclosure of narrative R&D information by investigating the effect of directors’ network connection on firms’ narrative R&D disclosure. Consistent with our expectation, we find that firms with better-connected directors disclose less narrative R&D information. This association is stronger for firms with: (1) higher litigation risk, (2) higher proprietary costs, (3) more opportunities to interact with directors at other firms, and (4) weaker corporate governance. Our results remain robust to employing the staggered adoption of the Universal Demand law and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine law as quasi-natural experiments, measuring the content of narrative R&D disclosure, using alternative measures of board network, and controlling for alternative private communication channels through financial analysts, institutional investors, and creditors. Collectively, our findings suggest that directors’ connection may serve as a private channel of disseminating narrative R&D information, substituting for the public channel of disclosure.