讲座之一：What’s in a Name? Eponymous Private Firms and Financial Reporting Quality
讲座教师：Radhakrishnan Suresh教授 美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校管理学院
讲座之二：Are Outside Directors with SEC Investigation Experience
Better Monitors?
讲座教师：Yuan Zhang副教授 美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校管理学院
讲座时间：2017年11月1日（周三）下午3点-5点半
讲座地点：文泉楼南401会计学院大会议室
讲座专家简介
Suresh Radhakrishnan，纽约大学斯特恩商学院会计学博士，纽约大学统计及运筹学专业硕士。曾任卡内基•梅隆大学访问助理教授、纽约大学斯特恩商学院助理教授、罗格斯大学管理学研究生院助理教授，现任德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校管理学院会计和公司治理专业特聘教授、德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校研究中心主任、德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校国际会计项目总监。曾任香港大学、台湾大学、香港理工大学、香港城市大学、复旦大学、西安交通大学等国内高等院校的客座教授。在公司治理方面研究成果卓著，主要研究成果发表于Management Science，The Accounting Review，Accounting, Organisations and Society，Contemporary Accounting Research，Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance，The International Journal of Accounting，Information Systems Research等期刊，代表作(仅列示部分)如下：
1. Corporate Lobbying, Visibility and Accounting Conservatism (with X. Kong, A. Tsang), Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, forthcoming.
2. “Corporate social responsibility report disclosures and analyst forecast accuracy,” (with S. Mutlu, V. Muslu and A. Tsang), Journal of Business Ethics, forthcoming.
3. “The effects of the auditor’s insurance role on reporting conservatism and audit quality,” (with Peicheng Liao), The Accounting Review, March 2016, 91(2): 587-602.
4. “The antecedents of co-developer participation in open source projects,” (with R. Jayant, K. Dogan and V. Jacob), ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, January 2016, 6(4).
5. “Can payment-per-click induce improvements in click fraud identification technologies?,” (with M. Chen, V. Jacob, Y. Ryu), Information Systems Research, December 2015, 26(4):754-772.
6. “Recognition of future news in earnings and price bubbles in experimental markets,” Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, 2015, 30(4): 558-575.
7. “Corporate political connections and the 2008 Malaysian election,” (with F. Gul and S. Fung), Accounting, Organisations and Society, 2015, 43: 67-83.
8. “Forward-looking disclosures in the MD&A and the financial information environment,” (with V. Muslu, K. R. Subramaniam and D. Lim), Management Science, 2015, 61: 931-948.
9. Discussion of “The effects of corporate governance and product market competition on analysts’ forecasts: Evidence from Brazilian capital market,” (with S. Janakiraman) The International Journal of Accounting, 2015, 50: 340-346.
10. “Analysts’ cash flow forecasts and accrual mispricing,” (with Shu-ling Wu), Contemporary Accounting Research, 2014, 31: 1191-1219.
Yuan Zhang, 南加州大学利文撒尔会计学院会计学博士，清华大学经济与管理学院会计学学士。曾任哥伦比亚大学助理教授，现任德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校会计学副教授，主要研究成果发表于Management Science,Journal of Accounting & Economics, Journal of Accounting Research,The Accounting Review ,Review of Accounting Studies,Journal of Portfolio Management等期刊，代表作如下：
1. Social Connections within Executive Teams and Management Forecasts (with Ruihao Ke, Meng Li, and Zhejia Ling). Accepted for publication, Management Science, 2017.
2. The Economic Consequences of Financial Restatements: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control (with Amir Amel-Zadeh). The Accounting Review, Vol. 90, No. 1, January 2015. Lead article.
3. Does Investment Efficiency Improve after the Disclosure of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control over Financial Reporting? (with Mei Cheng and Dan Dhaliwal). Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 56, No. 1, July 2013. Lead article.
4. Information Interpretation or Information Discovery: Which Role of Analysts Do Investors Value More? (with Joshua Livnat). Presented at the 2011 Review of Accounting Studies Conference; Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 2012.
5. Option Prices Leading Equity Prices: Do Option Traders Have an Information Advantage? (with Wen Jin and Joshua Livnat). Presented at the 2011 Journal of Accounting Research Conference;Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 50, No. 2, May 2012.
6. Analysts’ Earnings Forecast, Recommendation and Target Price Revisions (with Ronen Feldman and Joshua Livnat). Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 38, No. 3, Spring 2012.
7. Cover Me: Managers' Responses to Changes in Analyst Coverage in the Post-Regulation FD Period (with Divya Anantharaman). The Accounting Review, Vol. 86, No. 6, November 2011. Lead article.
8. Analysts’ Responsiveness and the Post Earnings Announcement Drift. Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 46, No. 1, September 2008.
9. Revenue Recognition Timing and Attributes of Reported Revenue: The Case of Software Industry’s Adoption of SOP 91-1. Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 39, No. 3, September 2005.
10. Regulation FD and the Financial Information Environment: Early Evidence (with Frank Heflin and K.R. Subramanyam). The Accounting Review, Vol. 78, No. 1, January 2003. Lead article.
讲座摘要
What’s in a Name? Eponymous Private Firms and Financial Reporting Quality
We examine the association between eponymy (i.e., naming a firm after the founder’s name) andfinancial reporting quality (FRQ). Using a unique dataset of 2,271 Italian private firms, we document that eponymy is positively associated with total accrual quality, working capital accrual quality, revenue accrual quality, and a composite index of the three measures. This relation is stronger for eponymous firms that have rarer names, consistent with the argument that name rarity increases the signaling role and reputational cost of eponymy. Corroborating these findings, we also find that the eponymy-FRQ relation is stronger for firms that operate only locally, and weaker for firms that operate in manufacturing-oriented businesses. Finally, we find that eponymous firms are associated with lower cost of debt: both directly and indirectly through their higher financial reporting quality. Collectively these findings suggest that reputational concerns act as a disciplining mechanism for financial reporting quality.
Are Outside Directors with SEC Investigation Experience Better Monitors?
We examine whether outside directors (directors with experience of SEC investigation, or DEIs) monitor financial reporting quality more effectively than other outside directors after the firms they serve are investigated by the SEC for accounting frauds. Using SEC investigations at one firm as a quasi-exogenous shock to other (non-investigated) firms the same DEI concurrently or subsequently serves, we first document that DEIs have higher attendance rate at board meetings relative to other outside directors, consistent with DEIs exerting greater monitoring effort. More importantly, we find that firms with DEIs on board have significantly lower likelihood of misreporting financial statements than firms without DEIs, especially when the investigation experience of these DEIs is recent. Our study contributes to the literature by documenting the positive spillover effect of SEC investigations through director reputation and director learning.
